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Abstract
The paper provides a novel, theoretically driven map of EU regional asymme-
tries, based on the shares and dynamics of high-tech employment and wages, as
well as the structure of inter-regional Input-Output relations at the EU NUTS-
1 regional level. We use data from EUROSTAT and the EU-REGIO database
to perform a trade-aware shift-share analysis coupled with a hierarchical clus-
tering. We show that EU regions present a fractal structure of asymmetries,
i.e. the emergence of core-periphery relations at progressively smaller scales,
in relation to both spatial and trade dimensions. We identify regional clusters
labelled ‘consolidated core’, ‘declining core’, ‘emerging cities’, ‘declining pe-
ripheries’ and ‘CEE factories’, and we show that there is a polarising dynamics
between driving and follower clusters, drawing implications for EU cohesion
policy.
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1 Introduction
European countries are facing unprecedented challenges in terms of post Covid-
19 pandemic resilience and recovery. The double-dips of the post-financial and
post-pandemic crises are slowing down employment, productivity and growth
prospects, while exacerbating pre-existent inequalities (Evenhuis et al., 2021).
Furthering inequalities is argued to engender social instability and political
polarisation (Rodŕıguez-Pose, 2018).
Persistent and potentially increasing asymmetries in the employment struc-
ture of EU countries are also due to the reconfiguration of trade patterns within
and outside the EU, and the intensity and (technological) quality of integration
in Global Value Chains (GVCs) (Bontadini et al., 2019). These trends seem
to have exacerbated the gap between core and non-core countries and favoured
the emergence of new peripheries (Wirkierman et al., 2018).
In response to this, the new EU cohesion policy package is being approved
at time of writing. It represents a — again unprecedented — set of cohesion
instruments and funds for the period 2021-2027, that add to the traditional Eu-
ropean Territorial Cooperation programmes (“Interreg”), European Regional
Development Fund (ERDF) and the Cohesion Fund (CF), by launching the
Just Transition Fund (JTF) as part of the EU Green New Deal.
The EU cohesion policy, at this particular historical moment, is a one-time
opportunity to tackle not only the post-pandemic recovery, but also the root,
structural causes of EU inequalities, across cities, regions and countries. Some
scholars argue that it is important to devise instruments that are ‘place-based
sensitive’ (Iammarino et al., 2020), and that are able to address the ‘geography
of discontent’ (Rodŕıguez-Pose, 2018). It is therefore all the more important to
understand old and new determinants of EU inequalities, particularly in terms
of regional employment and wage asymmetries.
Some of these root causes have been imputed to the long-term trends of
financialisation and financial globalisation, as well as to institutional factors
such as the lessening in the incentives to unionise and the bargaining power
of unions, in a context of more fragmented labour markets (Evenhuis et al.,
2021). The fragmentation of labour markets is in turn the result of a complex
and intertwined set of determinants, that have to do with sectoral structural
changes, technological change, and agglomeration forces that concentrate high-
tech activities and talents in urban areas.
A major role in the heightened inequality across EU regions has been played
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by changes in their industry mix (Cutrini, 2019), which has resulted in a few
technology ‘clubs’, with high-income clubs characterised by a specialisation in
manufacturing and highly productive services. It has been suggested that re-
gions with high concentrations of manufacturing activities typically have lower
levels of inequality, whereas regions with high concentrations of service activi-
ties, creative industries such as arts and entertainment, as well as knowledge-
intensive business services, tend to have higher levels of inequality (Cutrini,
2019). This is also affected by the concentration of high-skilled services, cre-
ative industries and generally more complex activities in urban contexts and
large cities (Balland et al., 2020).
An increase in employment in high-tech sectors (i.e. with a comparatively
higher share of high-skill workers) has a multiplier effect on other sectors, and
create jobs also in low-tech, non-tradeable sectors (Moretti and Thulin, 2013).
However, because these jobs are relatively poorly paid, average wages fall as
a consequence of increased high-tech employment, leading to an increase in
inequality (Lee and Clarke, 2019). This seems to be the case, for instance,
in the UK local labour markets (Travel-to-Work-Areas) where investments in
Research and Development in some areas seem to be associated to an increase
in routinised jobs (Ciarli et al., 2018).
More in general, innovation and high-tech activities tend to concentrate in
a few countries, in a few regions within countries, and in a few cities within
regions, in a structure that reproduces fractals. There seems to be a recursive
dynamics between specialising in high-tech activities (which require sophisti-
cated capabilities and high skills) and developing further complex activities,
that concentrate in fewer and fewer urban areas (Balland et al., 2020).
For instance, focusing on the case of metropolitan areas in the US, Balland
et al. (2020) find that the complexity of activities, variously measured, explains
from 40% to 80% of the variance in urban concentration of occupations, indus-
tries and technologies. Such concentration is accompanied by an increased con-
centration in high skills and know-how (Gomez-Lievano and Patterson-Lomba,
2019). As a result, growing economic inequalities between regions within coun-
tries, are accompanied by rising inequalities at the intra-regional level and
within cities (Evenhuis et al., 2021).
As argued above, the intertwined dynamics linked to: (i) changes in the
sectoral composition of regions and countries; (ii) technological changes, that
affect the complexification of production and increase requirements of high-tech
inputs and advanced skills; (iii) agglomeration forces that lead to the concen-
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tration of such activities in a few countries, a few regions within countries and
a few urban areas within regions, all contribute to make asymmetries persistent
and increase EU inequality.
What could slow down and reverse such a polarising dynamics, possibly
complement the efforts of any cohesion policy and allow ‘left behind places’ to
catch up? One such opportunities is provided by inter-regional (technological
and economic) inter-dependencies. These are claimed to be relevant for (pe-
ripheral) regions to learn technological capabilities from (core) regions (Balland
and Boschma, 2021). In addition, regions are more likely to enter new tech-
nological and scientific fields (measured by patents) when they are ‘connected’
to regions that have complementary capabilities to their own (Balland and
Boschma, 2021, p. 2). Hence, although peripheral regions diversify less, they
might benefit from connections to complementary regions.
The ambition of this paper is to take into account the above-mentioned
relevant dimensions and their relationships to characterise the differential tra-
jectories leading to EU regional inequality, and map them in a meaningful and
policy-relevant way. In addition to the contributions reviewed above, we also
consider the very important dimension of inter-regional ‘connectivity’, which we
proxy in terms of inter-regional trade in high-tech inputs. Mapping EU regions
also on the basis of inter-regional trade allows us to explore whether this is a
potential channel for catching up or, indeed, a further element of acceleration
of EU regional inequalities.
To operationalise the objective above, we combine hierarchical clustering
with a ‘trade-aware’ shift-share decomposition applied on a set of 67 NUTS-
1 EU regions covering the period 2010-2017/19, to account for the following
dimensions: the share and dynamics of employment in high-tech manufactur-
ing and knowledge-intensive service activities; the associated regional wage
share and high-tech wage rate dynamics; technological capabilities, in terms
of regional intensity of granted patents; as well as inter-regional backward and
forward trade linkages.
The further contribution of this paper is to map EU asymmetries in terms
of the peculiar fractal structure of the dimensions above. We therefore iden-
tify a novel ‘core-periphery’ structure amongst EU regions, which results from
the (long-term) polarising role of innovation, and that might have only been
exacerbated by the double-dip shocks of the financial crisis and the Covid-19
pandemic.
Overall, the evidence shows a number of new elements that explain a peculiar,
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fine-grained core-periphery fractal structure, that is, a recursive emergence of
core-periphery relations at progressively smaller scales, in relation to both the
spatial and trade dimensions. This is in line with some of the above literature,
but is based on an in-depth, exhaustive exploration of the role of inter-regional
trade in rendering regional dynamics interdependent.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 specifies the
data intensive methods and empirical strategy adopted. Section 3 reports the
results and offers a discussion of the fractal map of EU regional asymmetries.
Finally, section 4 briefly concludes, and draws implications for EU cohesion
policy.
2 Methods and Data
The aim of this section is to introduce the techniques, metrics, empirical strat-
egy and data used to devise a map of EU regions clustered by similarity in terms
of high-tech technological features, employment and wage rate dynamics.
2.1 Inter-regional Input-Output relations
To quantitatively characterise the innovativeness of a region, (per-capita) patent
applications by region r — labelled PATr in what follows — is a key and widely
used indicator.
However, patents measure innovative output which only potentially leads to
technological change, i.e. adoption and diffusion of new productive opportuni-
ties. To capitalise gains from patenting activity, regions that successfully codify
the knowledge contained in patents would be expected to engage in production
and trade of high-tech products.1 This may be inferred by recalling the over-
lap between IPC (International Patent Classification) codes and 2-digit NACE
Rev. 2 codes corresponding to high-tech industry types (see, e.g. Van Looy
et al., 2015, pp. 8-11).
To operationalise the extent to which regions produce and trade in high-
tech products we consider an inter-regional input-output (IRIO, hereinafter)
system. In an IRIO scheme with m regions and n industries, of which nh are
1According to EUROSTAT, high-tech industry and knowledge-intensive services comprise 2-digit codes 21,
26, 59 to 63 and 72 from the NACE Rev. 2 classification. See Table 2 below for details.
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where X ijrs represents intermediate input sales from high-tech sector i in region
r to purchasing industry j in region s, whereas K irs are fixed capital sales from
high-tech sector i in region r to (final demand in) region s.
With a focus on revealed regional competitiveness, we consider only inter-
regional trade, so intra-regional transactions can be set to zero, i.e. X ijrr =
K irr = 0. Hence, Trs in (1) is the value of deliveries of intermediate and fixed
capital high-tech inputs by region r to all purchasing industries in region s.
Matrix T = [Trs] is a square (m × m) inter-regional trade matrix in high-
tech products measuring gross flows. To uncover the structural features of
the trading regions, it is often useful to express the elements of T in intensive
terms. In particular, we may write:




i.e. psr is the payment by region s to region r for the purchase of high-tech
inputs, per unit of total high-tech input purchases by region s.
Matrix P = [psr] is non-negative (psr ≥ 0) and row-stochastic (
∑m
r=1 psr = 1),
each row representing the regional distribution of payments by region s for the
purchase of a (monetary) unit of high-tech inputs over regions r = 1, . . . ,m.
By superposing a chance process interpretation on P — through the device
of a finite Markov chain (Grinstead and Snell, 1997, p. 405) — we may describe
the emerging connectivity patterns between regions. Each non-negative element
psr can be interpreted as the probability of transitioning from region s (row s
in P ) to region r (column r in P ) in the upcoming iteration of the chance
process: e1 spent on high-tech inputs by region s has a probability psr of going
to region r. If region r receives that payment, it will produce high-tech output
generating income, inducing further spending, according to the probabilities in
its row r of matrix P .
As we iterate step-wise over this chance process, the probabilities of e1
being spent on each region as the process unfolds (say, from t = 0 to t = 1) are
given by pT(1) = p
T
(0)P , where p is a probability vector. This iteration process
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2) until a fixed point is reached:2
πTP = πT (3)
where, adopting the normalisation
∑m
r=1 πr = 1, π
T specifies the vector of
stationary probabilities. Intuitively, if we had e1 of expenditure in high-tech
inputs circulating in the inter-regional system, vector πT indicates how it would
be proportionally distributed across regions in the long run. Hence, each el-
ement of πT = [πr] captures the importance of region r as a producer (and
extra-regional exporter) of high-tech inputs in the inter-regional system.
If, instead, we focus on the delivery of products acting as a counterpart
to monetary payments in (2), coefficient ars is a measure proxying a direct
backward linkage effect, as it represents the induced high-tech input demand
by region s to provider region r.





proxying a direct forward linkage effect, as it represents the share of (extra-
)regional sales of high-tech inputs from region r to region s. Hence, for example,
the higher the value of drs, the higher the intensity with which a cost increase
of high-tech industries in region r would be transmitted to region s.
In traditional Input-Output analysis, backward and forward linkage effects
are interpreted from the perspective of the region generating the impulse, i.e. by
activating input demand (backward) or by passing through input costs (for-
ward), respectively. Hence, the aim is to understand how a given region affects
others, rather than to assess how it is affected by others.
If, instead, we adopt this latter perspective, forward linkage coefficient drs
quantifies how an increase in economic activity of region s induces higher ac-
tivity in region r. From the viewpoint of region r, the higher its share of sales
to region s, the higher its exposure to a change in economic activity in region s.
Correspondingly, from the viewpoint of region s, backward linkage coefficient
ars quantifies how a cost increase in region r will put a pressure on region s
to raise its own costs, the higher its share of high-tech inputs imported from
2Formally, row vector πT is the left eigenvector associated to the leading (unitary) eigenvalue of matrix
P . Assuming that matrix P is irreducible (i.e. P k has only positive entries for some k), the existence,
uniqueness and non-negativity of the solution to eigensystem (3) is guaranteed by the Perron-Frobenius
theorem (Meyer, 2000, p. 693).
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region r.
2.2 Trade-aware shift-share decomposition
With this interpretation in mind, we use trade inter-dependencies to formu-
late a ‘trade-aware’ shift-share decomposition (Nazara and Hewings, 2004) of
employment and wage rate dynamics in high-tech sectors.
In a system with m regions, we define Lir as the level of employment in sector i





for the employment in high-tech sectors within region r (with ∆Lhr indicating
the absolute change between two time periods), so that region’s r contribution


















Note that Chr in (5) measures a growth contribution, i.e. a ratio between two
absolute changes. Thus, it does not measure the pace of growth (as a rate of
change would), but the proportional contribution of region r to the absolute
change in aggregate employment.3
An interesting feature of indicator Chr is that it captures the regional dis-
tribution of absolute changes. As such, the uniform regional contribution is
given by 1/m, because if all m regions contributed equally, each would increase
(or decrease) employment by 1/m times the absolute change in aggregate em-
ployment. And this represents the first addendum of the right-hand side of
(5). The remaining two addenda will capture the regional deviation from the
uniform contribution.
In particular, from the perspective of region r, in order to understand how
changes in other regions affect its own employment, Chrs in (6) measures the
3The contribution to aggregate growth of variable X by region r is defined as:
∆Xr
∆X























, where Gr and G are the growth rates of variable
X for region r and the aggregate, respectively. That is, the contribution to growth measures the combined
effect of a growth rate differential (between r and the aggregate) coupled with the initial share of r in the
total.
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growth contribution by all high-tech product destinations of region r. The
change in employment in each purchasing region s is weighted by its impor-
tance for region r, by means of forward linkage coefficient drs. Hence, if the
destinations of region r increase their employment, this would induce demand
for region’s r high-tech output, expanding its high-tech employment. Note that
Chrs is region-specific (as regional trading partners will differ). Thus, the second
addendum of the right-hand of (5) — (Chrs − 1/m) — captures the extent to
which growth contributions by region’s r trading partners exceed (or fall short
of) the uniform contribution; potentially driving employment growth in region
r.
Instead, the third addendum of the right-hand side of (5) — (Chr − Chrs)
— captures the extent to which region’s r own growth contribution exceeds
(or falls short of) that of its trading partners. That is, whether region r is
over-performing (or under-performing) its closest ‘neighbours’, in terms of its
proportional contribution to aggregate high-tech employment changes.
In this way, the three addenda in decomposition (5) allow to quantify respec-
tively the uniform contribution to growth, the influence of the context in which
a region is operating, and its over-performance within that context.
The fact that units of employment across regions are additive renders possible
the use of the contribution to growth as an indicator of regional dynamics.
However, when we want to apply the same decomposition for wage rates, these
are no longer additive, as they are expressed per unit of employment. Therefore,
wage rate dynamics will be analysed in terms of rates of change.
In a system with m regions, if whr stands for the (nominal) wage rate in high-
tech sectors within region r (with ∆whr indicating the absolute change between
two time periods), the rate of change in region’s r high-tech wage rate may be




























Decomposition (7) follows a similar logic to (5), but works in terms of growth
rates, rather than growth contributions. As may be seen from (8), the first
addendum of the right-hand side of (7) corresponds to the growth rate of the
cross-regional, aggregate high-tech wage rate Gh. Note that W hr in (8) stands
for the total (monetary) labour compensation paid in high-tech sectors within
region r. The remaining two addenda of (7) capture the regional deviation
from the aggregate growth rate.
In particular, from the perspective of region r, in order to understand how
changes in other regions affect its own wage rate, Ghsr in (9) measures the wage
rate growth of all suppliers of high-tech products to region r. The increase in
labour costs in each supplier region is weighted by its importance as an input
source for region r, by means of backward linkage coefficient asr. Hence, if
regions from which r buys its high-tech inputs increase their wage rates, there
will be a pressure on input users in region r to increase their wage rate as well.
Note that Ghsr is region-specific (as regional trading partners will differ). Thus,
the second addendum of the right-hand of (7) — (Ghsr − Gh) — captures the
extent to which the pace of high-tech wage rate expansion of region’s r trading
partners exceeds (or falls short of) aggregate high-tech wage rate dynamics.
Instead, the third addendum of the right-hand side of (7) — (Ghr − Ghsr) —
captures the extent to which region’s r own growth rate exceeds (or falls short
of) that of its trading partners. That is, whether region r is increasing labour
costs proportionally more (or less) than its closest ‘neighbours’.
In this way, the three addenda in decomposition (7) allow to quantify the
cross-regional, aggregate high-tech wage rate growth, the influence of the con-
text in which a region is operating, and its labour cost advantage (or disadvan-
tage) within that context.
2.3 Empirical strategy: hierarchical clustering and appreciative theorising
On the basis of the indicators derived so far, our empirical strategy may be
described as follows. Our starting point is a multivariate sample of observations






where PATr stands for (per-capita) patent applications to the European Patent
Office (EPO), πr — obtained from (3) — is an indicator of a region’s high-tech
trade centrality, Chr — defined in (5) — measures a region’s contribution to the
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growth of aggregate high-tech employment, and Ghr — defined in (7) — is the
rate of change of a region’s high-tech wage rate.
We aim to identify a set of mutually exclusive regional groups, i.e. clusters,
based on (relatively) similar within-group values when considering all variables
in (10) jointly. To do so, we apply a data-driven, agglomerative hierarchical
clustering technique (Everitt and Hothorn, 2011, p. 166) to obtain a regional
map of high-tech ‘clubs’ in the EU.
Intuitively, if we had only two dimensions by which to compare regions,
e.g. patent applications (PATr) and high-tech trade centrality (πr), the problem
would be relatively straightforward to visualise: groups would be identified by
drawing lines across a two-dimensional scatter-plot separating different ‘clouds’
of dots, each dot representing a region along those two dimensions.
However, considering q = 4 dimensions simultaneously requires to refine both
the assessment of the relative distance between q-dimensional (data) points, as
well as the procedure to merge regions into groups.
To compute the distance between region r and s across the q variables, we
use the Euclidean distance. And given that the variables in (10) differ in their















where x̄k and SDk are the cross-regional sample average and standard deviation,
respectively, for variable k = 1, . . . , q.
As an outcome, the obtained symmetric bilateral distance matrix Γ = [δrs] is
used to merge regions into groups. Starting from a set of m = 67 clusters (each
representing a different region), the agglomerative algorithm merges the nearest
pair of distinct clusters into a new group, iteratively repeating the process until
only one group (containing all regions) is obtained.
While the bilateral distance between two regions is given by (11), the distance
between any two regional groups will be given by the distance between those




where A and B are regional groups. The clustering rule given by (12) is known
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as complete linkage (or farthest neighbour) clustering (Everitt and Hothorn,
2011, p. 167). Intuitively, regional groups will be merged in this case when the
most distant pair of regions between two groups are still relatively closer than
with respect to any other group.
Applying this iterative algorithm leads to a hierarchical structure known as
dendrogram, in which regions have been successively merged into non-overlapping
subsets.
After allocating regions into their respective clusters, we considered decom-
positions (5) and (7), together with additional contextual variables, in order
to perform an exercise in ‘appreciative theorising’ (Nelson, 1998, p. 500): a
theoretically-informed data interpretation exercise which remains close to em-
pirical details. The full set of variables considered is reported in Table 1.
A relevant methodological point of our approach concerns the fact that the
clustering algorithm has been applied on a subset of only four variables: PATr
and πr summarise technological features of innovation and revealed high-tech
competitiveness, whereas Chr and G
h
r capture employment and labour cost dy-
namics. We then explain regional differences considering all indicators in Table
1, including region-specific components of decompositions (5) and (7). In this
way, we uncover cluster-level features enriching the description of the map of























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.4 Data: High-tech employment, wage rates and inter-regional input trade in
European NUTS-1 regions
Collating and articulating comparable data at a regional level across EU coun-
tries on high-tech sectors for all dimensions covered in the previous paragraphs
is a challenging task. Given the trade-off between coverage and granularity, we
had to make some compromises.
Our two data sources are EUROSTAT and the EU-REGIO database (Thissen
et al., 2018). We adopted the definition of high-tech industry and knowledge
intensive services established by EUROSTAT, comprising a subset of 2-digit
codes from the NACE Rev. 2 classification, as reported in Table 2.4
Table 2: High-tech industry and knowledge-intensive services
Aggregation by NACE Rev. 2
Code Descriptor
C_HTC 21 Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and 
pharmaceutical preparations;
26 Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products.
Code Descriptor
KIS_HTC 59 to 63 Motion picture, video and television programme 
production, sound recording and music publish activities; 
Programming and broadcasting activities; 
Telecommunications; computer programming, consultancy 
and related activities; Information service activities;
72 Scientific research and development.







NACE Rev. 2. Codes - 2digit level
NACE Rev. 2. Codes - 2digit level
Data on high-tech employment (in thousand persons) at the NUTS-1 regional
level between 2010 and 2019 comes from the EU Labour force survey (LFS).5
We have used this data source to obtain Chr in (5), computing the change
between three-year averages (2017-2019 with respect to 2010-2012), with the
aim of capturing more persistent trends.
In order to obtain Ghr in (7), we used mutually consistent data on (cur-
rent price) gross value added, compensation of employees and employment (in
thousand hours worked) at the NUTS-1 level between 2010 and 2017 from
EUROSTAT’s regional economic accounts.6 Also in this case, we computed
4For details on the classification of industries by technological intensity, see: https://ec.europa.eu/
eurostat/cache/metadata/Annexes/htec_esms_an3.pdf
5For details, see: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/metadata/en/htec_esms.htm
6For details, see: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/metadata/en/reg_eco10_esms.htm
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the change between three-year averages (2015-2017 with respect to 2010-2012).
However, we had to make two compromises. First, sectoral disaggregation is at
the 1-digit, section level of the NACE Rev. 2 classification. Therefore, we prox-
ied the coverage of industries from Table 2 by considering the combined wage
rate of NACE Rev. 2 letters C and J, i.e. ‘Manufacturing’ and ‘Information and
Communication’ sectors, respectively. Second, regional data points are based
on the NUTS 2016 classification. Unfortunately, due to regional border re-
definitions in the transition between NUTS 2013 and NUTS 2016, France and
Poland only report regional accounts data from 2016 onwards. Hence, regions
from these two countries had to be excluded from the analysis.
Moreover, note that whr in (7) represents the nominal hourly wage rate (in
e/hour). There is a twofold motivation behind this conscious choice. First, we
are mostly concerned with the high-tech wage rate as a production cost, rather
than as a source of aggregate demand. In the latter case, adjusting for the
purchasing power of wages (using national consumer price indices) would have
been more relevant. In fact, whr represents a sectoral — rather than economy-
wide — magnitude. Second, the evolution of the nominal wage rate aims to
proxy a key component of price dynamics, in order to infer changes in sectoral
cost competitiveness. This is also why nominal magnitudes have been expressed
in e across regions (even for those with a different national currency).
Data from patent applications to the EPO per million inhabitants at the
NUTS-1 regional level have been obtained from EUROSTAT.7 Data is available
up to the year 2012, so we considered the three-year average 2010-2012. Hence,
variable PATr in (10) measures the ‘initial condition’ of regional innovation
output.8
Finally, inter-regional intermediate and fixed capital input trade data to build
accounting system (1) and all its derived magnitudes — including linkage co-
efficients ars and drs in (2) and (4), respectively — has been extracted and
articulated from the EU-REGIO database. This database includes the first
yearly time-series of inter-regional Input-Output tables with detail for Euro-
pean regions at the NUTS-2 level, covering the 2000-2010 period.9 As with data
coming from regional economic accounts, we had to make some compromises.
First, the database sectoral disaggregation consists of 14 industries collating ac-
7For details, see: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/metadata/en/pat_esms.htm
8Moreover, we translated regional data originally codified in the NUTS 2013 classification into the NUTS 2016
one.
9For details, see: https://data.overheid.nl/en/dataset/d345b89c-d203-494a-a6d6-f95a3a62ada3.
The database may be accessed at: https://dataportaal.pbl.nl/downloads/PBL_Euregio/.
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tivities from the ISIC Rev. 3 classification. Hence, we proxied the coverage of
industries from Table 2 by considering sectors ‘Coke, refined petroleum, nuclear
fuel and chemicals’ (which includes pharmaceutical products) and ‘Electrical,
optical and transport equipment’ (which includes the manufacturing of com-
puter, electronic and optical products).10 Second, we aggregated NUTS-2-level
transactions into a NUTS-1 scheme, under the NUTS 2016 classification.11 Fi-
nally, given the time span covered by EU-REGIO, we used the latest available
year (2010) to compute the high-tech trade centrality indicator πr in (10), as
well as linkage coefficients ars and drs. Thus, regional trade weights of shift-
share decompositions (5) and (7) are fixed across time.
As an outcome, we articulated a dataset for m = 67 NUTS-1 European
regions, reported in Table 5 of Appendix A. The argument for choosing the
NUTS-1 level of analysis is twofold. First, it allows for a more comprehensive
coverage of current EU member states. Data points for several region × year
combinations at the NUTS-2 level are missing, for some of the variables con-
sidered. Second, the NUTS-1 level allows for a more parsimonious description
of results. As a drawback, for relatively smaller countries, some of the regions
included correspond to their entire country.
3 Results and Discussion
In this section we report and discuss our empirical results. First, we describe
the clusters obtained through the empirical strategy specified in section 2, char-
acterising and distinguishing each cluster by means of the expanded variable set
of Table 1. Then, we discuss the results highlighting the fractal configuration
of high-tech differences across EU regions.
3.1 Hierarchical clustering of European NUTS-1 regions
Figure 1 displays the dendrogram obtained from applying the hierarchical clus-
tering algorithm on distance matrix Γ = [δrs], computed according to (11).
12
10Unfortunately, the ‘Real estate, renting and business activities’ sector of the EU-REGIO database merges
knowledge-intensive services with sectors which notoriously distort inter-regional trade of high-tech products.
Hence, we have not included this EU-REGIO industry aggregate amongst the set of high-tech products used
to articulate the system of inter-regional flows (1).
11Croatia has not been explicitly included in the EU-REGIO database, so we had to exclude it from the
analysis. Moreover, transactions for Bulgarian and Romanian regions are only available at the national
level, so we estimated inter-regional transactions for these two countries by distributing country-level values
using regional shares in gross value added.
12Distance matrix Γ = [δrs] is graphically represented in Appendix A, Figure 6.
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Source: Own elaboration based on EUROSTAT data and EU-REGIO database.
Notes: Regional NUTS-1 codes are described in Appendix A, Table 5.
Cluster labelling is based on the analysis reported below. Our main interest
is on the 5 clusters encompassing regions from different EU countries, as Greek
regions followed a sufficiently distinct dynamics to become a cluster of their
own. Moreover, in order to grasp the spatial pattern of cluster composition,
Figure 2 depicts the geographical layout of the identified clusters.
To characterise each cluster and its constituting regions, Tables 3 and 4
report the values of all variables specified in Table 1 by region and averaged
by cluster. Columns [01], [02], [04] and [10] correspond to the variables
in (10) used to compute the clusters of regions; columns [04]-[07] correspond
to the shift-share decomposition of high-tech employment growth specified in
(5), whereas columns [10]-[13] to the shift-share decomposition of wage rate
growth in manufacturing and ICT services specified in (7).
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Source: Own elaboration based on EUROSTAT data and EU-REGIO database.

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The first cluster (Figure 2 and Table 3) is composed of EU regions that are
part of the ‘consolidated core’ of the European innovation system (cluster 1).
These regions include some of the most innovative European cities with a strong
tradition in manufacturing such as Munich, Hamburg, Copenhagen, Amster-
dam and Stockholm, plus some highly innovative regions in Austria, Belgium,
Germany (Baden-Wurttemberg), Sweden (Sodra Sverige) and Finland. Taken
together, these 16 regions (24% of the total) account for 61% of (per capita)
patent applications in 2010-12 across all regions (column [01]).13 Beyond in-
ventions, these regions are also main suppliers of high-tech inputs to all other
regions, producing 59% of high-tech inter-regional trade (3.67% per region, on
average, which is 2.3 times greater than the second highest cluster) (column
[02]). This is an impressive concentration of productive and technological
capabilities, if we also consider that a consistent share of high-tech products
exported by these regions is consumed within the cluster.14
These leading European regions include some of the “large cities” that have
been attracting most innovation and developing the most complex technologies
(Balland et al., 2020). They are also the cities that generate the high-tech jobs
with highest wages. While the initial average hourly wage rate was already 1.54
times above the cross-regional average (column [16]), it has also experienced
the highest absolute growth (column [19]).
Despite starting from a relatively high share of employment in high-tech
industries (4.46% on average, column [14]), regions in cluster 1 have a relative
contribution to the absolute change in EU high-tech employment in line with
a uniform value (1.44% in column [04] with respect to 1.49% in column [05],
respectively). This increase in high-tech employment is accompanied by the
highest average contribution to total employment growth across regions (2.9%
per region, on average, in column [03]). That is, they attract employment in
high-tech industries as well as in the rest of the regional economy (Moretti and
Thulin, 2013).
Being composed of traditionally strong manufacturing regions, the cluster’s
impressive high-tech trade centrality (column [02]) is matched by contributing
to over 45% of EU-wide high-tech manufacturing employment increase (column
[08]). Notably, two regions alone — Baden-Wurttemberg (DE1) and Bayern
13All column numbers refer to Tables 3 and 4.
14The intensity of inter-regional trade relations in high-tech products may be quantified by direct forward (drs)
and backward (ars) linkage coefficients, computed according to (4) and (2), respectively. Tables 7 and 8 in
Appendix A report the most relevant direct linkage coefficients.
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(DE2) — account for almost 35% of the EU-wide increase.15
Not only is the cluster’s high-tech employment growth contribution close to
a uniform cross-regional value, but also its wage rate dynamics is closest to
the average EU-wide growth rate (11.96 p.p. in column [10] with respect to
11.02 p.p. in column [11], respectively). This is coupled with a cluster average
wage share which is second to highest and increasing (columns [16] and [18],
respectively).
In sum, the regions in the ‘consolidated core’ are characterised by a pat-
tern of virtuous accumulation of technological capabilities, high-tech produc-
tive centrality, attracting highly remunerated high-tech employment, with a
fairer region-wide distribution of the fruits of technical progress.
The performance of cluster 1 partially leads the dynamics of three other
clusters, either negatively (‘declining core’, cluster 2) or positively (‘emerging
cities’, cluster 3 and ‘CEE factories’, cluster 5, though for different reasons).
Instead, cluster 4 (‘declining peripheries’) is weakly connected with the ‘con-
solidated core’ (and with most other clusters) in terms of high-tech input trade
linkages (see Tables 7 and 8 in Appendix A). We discuss them in turn.
The second cluster (Figure 2 and Table 3) is composed of 16 regions that
are peripheral to the ‘consolidated core’, and which we label ‘declining core’
(cluster 2). Its 16 regions are also innovative: while representing only 24%
of the total, they account for over 20% of (per capita) patent applications in
2010-12. However, beyond inventions, these regions account for only 14% of
high-tech inter-regional input trade (0.88% per region, on average, in column
[02]). The ‘declining core’ includes all Belgian, Dutch, German, and Swedish
regions not included in cluster 1.16
These regions are the main extra-cluster suppliers to the ‘consolidated core’
and, to some extent, also main buyers from it (see Tables 7 and 8 in Appendix
A). However, with only a few exceptions, their share of high-tech employment
decreased between 2010-12 and 2017-19 (column [17]). It is the cluster with
the lowest proportional contribution to EU-wide high-tech employment increase
(column [04]), and has the sharpest negative differential with respect to the
contribution of their main trading destinations, which are from cluster 1 (col-
umn [07]). Regions from cluster 2 also have the lowest contribution to total
15The sharply negative growth contributions by Manner-Suomi (FI1) and Zuid-Nederland (NL4) could represent
either a potential long-run decline or an outsourcing strategy of manufacturing output. For example, from
Table 8 in Appendix A, it emerges that Eesti (EE0) and Latvija (LV0) source 27.1% and 24.5%, respectively,
of their high-tech input requirements from Manner-Suomi (FI1).
16The cluster also includes Luxembourg and two other peripheral regions from Hungary and Malta.
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employment growth, led by a negligible increase in high-tech services and a
decline in high-tech manufacturing (columns [08]-[09]). This declining trend
might predate the period considered, given the relatively low regional high-tech
employment share already present in 2010-12, in contrast to their innovative
performance.
Despite the negative employment performance, high-tech sector wages in
these regions grew, on average, faster than in the ‘consolidated core’ — their
main input suppliers — explaining the positive wage growth differential (col-
umn [13]). Hence, the fast pace of wage rate growth seems to benefit cluster
2 regions from the geographical closeness to the ‘consolidated core’, despite
losing jobs to them.
Cluster 3 (Figure 2 and Table 4) is composed of regions scattered across the
four cardinal points of the EU. Similarly to the first cluster of ‘consolidated
core’ regions, some of these are large cities (Berlin, Budapest, Madrid); some
are small countries/regions centred around a capital (or main) city (Ireland,
Portugal, Estonia, Czech Republic, Vienna, Northern Italy and Central Italy).
With an heterogeneous patenting activity within the cluster, taken together
these regions accounted for 13% of (per capita) patent applications in 2010-12
(column [1]). This inventive activity is accompanied by the second highest
trade centrality (column [02]), jointly accounting for over 18% of the produc-
tion of high-tech inter-regional input trade.
Despite a substantially lower starting point, these ‘emerging cities’ have the
highest average contribution to EU-wide absolute change in high-tech employ-
ment (3.8% per region, on average, in column [04]). This increase in high-tech
employment is significantly over-performing its trading destinations (column
[07]), and is accompanied by a notorious contribution to EU-wide increase in
total employment (2.8% per region, on average, in column [03]). This per-
formance suggests that the ‘emerging cities’ represent an attraction force for
employment in the neighbouring regions (mainly the ‘declining peripheries’ in
cluster 4).
Beyond the underlying innovative and productive capabilities, these regions
differ substantially from those in the ‘consolidated core’ on several accounts.
First, the cluster of ‘emerging cities’ accounts for almost 46% of EU-wide in-
crease in high-tech knowledge-intensive services, with an average regional con-
tribution of 4.2% (column [09]). Instead, the cluster’s contribution to high-
tech manufacturing employment growth is — though still considerable — less
than half of its contribution to service employment growth (column [08]).
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Second, wage rates do not follow the same virtuous dynamics as they do
in the ‘consolidated core’: the initial average hourly high-tech wage rate is
substantially lower (column [16]) and its increase in absolute terms is less
than half of that in cluster 1 (column [19]). Its growth rate (column [10]) is
below average, and substantially less than that of the cluster’s high-tech input
suppliers (consisting mostly of intra-cluster regions, the ‘consolidated core’, and
‘declining peripheries’). Finally, the regional wage share is below 50% (column
[15]) and decreasing (column [18]), suggesting an increase in within-region
inequality.
Highly connected to all other regions through high-tech input trade, the
dynamics of some of the ‘emerging cities’ may contain elements of ‘spurious’
growth in high-tech employment, being mostly in service sectors requiring a
degree of innovation capabilities, but which do not attract particularly high
paying jobs, if not from the ‘declining peripheries’.
The two remaining clusters are very different in relation to both innovation
and wages. Altogether, these 20 regions (30% of the total) account for 4% of
(per capita) patenting activity in 2010-12, with only two regions — Noreste in
Spain (ES2) and Slovenija (SI0) — being responsible for almost half of these
patents. The two clusters differ substantially between them but are both trade
peripheries, especially of the ‘emerging cities’.
The fourth cluster (Figure 2 and Table 4) is composed of peripheral regions
in Southern and Central Europe. These are the ‘declining peripheries’ (cluster
4). Beyond their low patenting activity, these regions account for only 6.5%
of the production of high-tech inter-regional input trade (0.65% per region, on
average, in column [02]).
Similarly to the relation between the ‘consolidated’ and ‘declining’ core, ‘de-
clining peripheries’ are located around ‘emerging cities’, and their inter-regional
high-tech input trade is precisely concentrated around them, as well as around
other intra-cluster regions (see Tables 7 and 8 in Appendix A).
Cluster 4 regions seem to be losing ground in all respects. Their contained
contribution to employment growth is observed both economy-wide (0.91% on
average, in column [03]) and specifically in high-tech sectors (0.80% on aver-
age, in column [04]). Within the latter, their low dynamism is evinced by the
negative differential with respect to the cluster’s high-tech input destinations
(column [07]). This is similar to what happens between the ‘declining core’ and
the ‘consolidated core’, with the substantial difference that the hourly high-tech
wage rate of ‘declining peripheries’ has been relatively stagnant (columns [10]
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and [19]) — particularly in relation to their main high-trade input suppliers
(column [13]) — and the average regional wage share has declined sharply
(column [18]). Instead, the ‘declining core’ experiences the fastest pace of
wage rate expansion, faster than that of their high-tech input suppliers.
Hence, while peripheries evince a similar pattern of stagnant high-tech em-
ployment in relation to their respective core, they show an opposite trajectory
in terms of high-tech wage growth, suggesting further income polarisation.
Cluster 5 (Figure 2 and Table 4) includes regions in Central-Eastern Eu-
rope (CEE) that in 2010-12 had almost no contribution to EU-wide innovation
outputs (less than 1% of per capita patent applications and 2% of high-tech
inter-regional trade, columns [01]-[02]) and had a relatively low initial share
of employment in high-tech sectors (2.54% per region, on average, in column
[14]). These ‘CEE factories’ compete mainly on the basis of unit labour costs.
At first sight, these regions may be seen as a relative success story of Euro-
pean integration. Their contribution to EU-wide absolute change in high-tech
employment is second only to the ‘emerging cities’ (2.4% per region, on average,
in column [04]) and over-performing their high-tech input destinations (col-
umn [07]). Notably, the contribution to high-tech employment has been the
most balanced across all clusters when considering the distinction between high-
tech manufacturing and knowledge-intensive services (columns [08]-[09]).
However, the growth of high-tech employment did not go hand in hand with
overall regional employment growth. The relative contribution of the cluster to
EU-wide total employment has been considerably smaller (0.8% per region, on
average, in column [03]) than its contribution to high-tech employment. While
this might suggest a process of relative specialisation, such growth differential
actually alerts on a process of net migration of the CEE labour force (Astrov
et al., 2019).
In terms of the high-tech wage rate, a ‘convergence-type’ dynamics may be
observed: starting from the lowest hourly average wage rate (column [16]),
regions from cluster 5 experienced the fastest proportional growth in wages
(41.7 p.p. per region, on average, in column [10]), and an absolute increase
which is very close to that of the ‘emerging cities’ (column [19]). In fact,
the cluster has had a high-tech wage rate increase 30.4 p.p. above that of its
high-tech input providers (column [13]).
While, on the one hand, such a high increase in high-tech wage rates vis-à-vis
the rest of the regional economy is likely to increase inequality between sectors,
on the other hand, high-tech wage dynamics was accompanied by a sizeable
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increase in the regional aggregate wage share (3.23 p.p. per region, on average,
in column [18]).
However, regions from Cluster 5 highly depend on high-tech input provision
from ‘emerging cities’ and ‘declining peripheries’, possibly due to their out-
sourcing strategies (see Table 8 in Appendix A). This raises questions on how
strong and persistent high-tech employment growth in ‘CEE factories’ may be,
particularly if they do not develop endogenous innovative capabilities.
Finally, the case of Greece evinces the risks of increasing regional polari-
sation within the EU. Figure 1 suggests that Greek regions would have been
clustered with declining areas of Europe. But their trajectory is worryingly
unique. The positive contribution of (only) two of its regions to high-tech
employment growth (column [04]) is coupled with country-wide, sharp defla-
tionary high-tech wage dynamics (column [10]), negative contribution to total
employment growth (column [03]) and decreasing regional wage share (column
[18]). Greek regions are also weakly integrated with the rest of Europe, being
mostly mutually dependent and, to a lesser extent, relying on high-tech input
provision from some of the ‘emerging cities’ (see Tables 7 and 8 in Appendix
A).
3.2 Discussion: the fractal structure of regional high-tech dynamics
Overall, the results confirm the well-known core-periphery structure among
EU regions, but the evidence shows a number of new elements to explain this
structure, and possibly offers a potential handle to reduce such inequalities,
based on the analysis of the interactions between these regions.
The results suggest a fractal structure of European regions, characterised by
the presence of similar patterns recurring at a progressively smaller scale: a
recursive emergence of core-periphery relations at different scales, in relation
to both the spatial and trade dimensions.
The first core-periphery relation is the standard one between the highly in-
novative regions in the two ‘core’ clusters (1 and 2) and the low/non-innovative
peripheries (with a few exceptions) in the other three clusters (3, 4 and 5). This
first asymmetry — determined by innovation outputs — is further deepened by
the role of knowledge in developing high-tech productive potential across re-
gions, as evinced by the strong, positive correlation between (per-capita) patent
applications and high-tech trade centrality, depicted in Figure 3.
Within each of these groups, we observe a second core-periphery layer. The
‘consolidated core’ keeps growing at a fast rate, attracts high skilled workers
26
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Contribution to employment growth (2010−12 to 2017−19)
Source: Own elaboration based on EUROSTAT data and EU-REGIO database. Notes: variable numbers
correspond to those specified in Table 1. The Pearson correlation coefficient is included.
in high-tech industries, keeps innovating, with the two ‘core’ clusters trading
with each other. The regions across the two clusters are strongly connected by
input-output relations, as well as by geographical proximity. Despite the stag-
nant employment dynamics of the ‘declining core’, its regions are an important
source of labour and high-tech inputs for the ‘consolidated core’.
Similarly, the second group of clusters is led by the ‘emerging cities’, which
the remaining two clusters depend on, albeit in different ways. The cluster of
‘declining peripheries’ provides ‘emerging cities’ with both labour force — as
suggested by its stagnant local employment — and high-tech inputs produced
at low unit labour costs, as these regions themselves experience a decline in
wage shares and sluggish high-tech wa es rates. The ‘CEE factories’ provide
low unit labour cost inputs to he ‘emerging cities’, and in turn depend on
the latter — and on the ‘consolidated core’ — for their own inputs, evincing
a dense process of offshoring. At the same time, the ‘emerging cities’ depend
on both the ‘declining peripheries’ and the ‘consolidated core’ as their main
source of low cost employment and high-tech inputs, respectively, articulating
a multi-layered core-periphery structure.
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It is not clear whether this arrangement will constitute a virtuous dynamics,
or if these three clusters (3, 4 and 5) may risk to decline, depending on the
extent to which regions in the ‘emerging cities’ innovate, compete and maintain
the current driving role for the peripheries of Europe through their high-tech
expansion.
In this regard, it is noticeable the geographical divide within ‘emerging
cities’ when comparing the asymmetry in employment growth contribution by
type of high-tech sector. Most cluster regions from Central/Northern Europe
contribute relatively more to high-tech manufacturing (AT1, DE3, IE0, HU1),
whereas Southern European regions contribute relatively more (or even only
to) to high-tech knowledge intensive services (ES3, ES5, ITC, ITH, ITI, PT1).
This is particularly relevant because regional contributions to high-tech em-
ployment growth by industry type are, essentially, uncorrelated, as depicted in
Figure 4. Hence, strong complementarities between high-tech manufacturing
and service sectors are the exception, rather than the rule, so path-dependency
in regional specialisation patterns may be expected.
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Source: Own elaboration based on EUROSTAT data and EU-REGIO database. Notes: variable numbers
correspond to those specified in Table 1. The Pearson correlation coefficient is included.
Although both play a centripetal role with respect to their neighbouring
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clusters, the ‘consolidated core’ and the ‘emerging cities’ seem to follow different
strategies to grow, attract and generate high-tech employment. Regions in
the ‘consolidated core’ also increase high-tech wages and the regional wage
share, whereas regions in the ‘emerging cities’ do not sufficiently catch-up in
terms of wage rate growth with the ‘core’, reduce their wage share, and attract
employment from regions with relatively low unit labour costs.
We observe inequalities emerging within regions in the ‘emerging cities’, ‘de-
clining peripheries’ and ‘CEE factories’, in connection to their higher contribu-
tion to high-tech employment growth. Starting from relatively low wage shares
and rates, most regions in these clusters experience a decline in the wage share
(except the ‘CEE factories’ that cannot go any lower) and a relatively low in-
crease in high-tech sector wages with respect to the European average and with
respect to their trading partners. Within the ‘CEE factories’, where high-tech
sector wages increase rapidly, inequality is likely created with respect to the
wages in other sectors.





































0 2 4 6







































2 4 6 8



































10 20 30 40 50

































0 2 4 6























−5.0 −2.5 0.0 2.5 5.0 7.5


























Contribution to employment growth (2010−12 to 2017−19)
Source: Own elaboration based on EUROSTAT data and EU-REGIO database. Notes: variable numbers
correspond to those specified in Table 1. The Pearson correlation coefficient is included.
In this regard, the catch-up process with leading regions suggests the com-
bination of two mechanisms at work. As depicted in Panel (A) of Figure 5, for
initial high-tech employment shares below 3%, a convergence-type of mecha-
nism seems to be operating but, above this threshold, a Kaldorian mechanism
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of cumulative dynamics seems more plausible, where initial shares are positively
correlated with growth contributions. Notably, Panel (B) of Figure 5 suggests
a similar configuration for high-tech wage rates: regions with an initial hourly
wage rate below e20/hour have a faster rate of wage growth, whereas for those
with a higher initial wage rate, a positive relationship between the initial wage
level and its growth rate is observed.
Therefore, for both high-tech employment quantities and costs, convergence
mechanisms operate up to a threshold, from where path-dependent, cumulative
dynamics take hold. If this is the case, the possibility of European regions
catching up — on the basis of high-tech sectoral upgrading — risks to remain
an unfulfilled aim.
4 Concluding Remarks
The paper has investigated high-tech employment and wage rate dynamics
across 67 European NUTS-1 regions during the 2010-19 period, i.e. between the
aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis (2007-09) and before the unleashing
of the Covid-19 pandemic (2020). Combining hierarchical clustering with a
‘trade-aware’ shift-share decomposition, the paper has offered a novel angle to
identify and map European regional inequalities. A fractal structure emerges,
that entails differences in concentration of high-tech sectors, highly skilled jobs
and innovation performance.
Our empirical strategy led to the identification of 5 inter-country regional
clusters: ‘consolidated core’, ‘declining core’, ‘emerging cities’, ‘declining pe-
ripheries’ and ‘CEE factories’.
Most importantly, though — as the cluster labelling suggests — a multi-
layered core-periphery structure emerges by considering the inter-regional high-
tech input trade network. First, while the stagnant employment dynamics in
the ‘declining core’ suggests that it loses jobs to the ‘consolidated core’, the
latter pulls the former by absorbing its high-tech inputs. Second, a further
core-periphery layer is represented by the trade links between the ‘emerging
cities’ and both the ‘declining peripheries’ and ‘CEE factories’. The former
similarly pulls the two latter, in terms of attracting labour force (‘declining
peripheries’) and sustaining high-tech input demand (‘CEE factories’).
In the first case, though, inter-regional trade between clusters at the innova-
tive ‘core’ of the EU is able to leverage on the leading regions of the ‘consoli-
dated core’ to support regions within the ‘declining core’. In the second case,
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inter-regional trade does not (yet) seem to represent a learning or catching up
opportunity for neither the ‘declining peripheries’ nor the ‘CEE factories’.
Hence, so far, the dynamics between ‘emerging cities’ and their periph-
eries represents a different, less sustainable model. The limited extent of
convergence-type dynamics in high-tech wage rates — coupled with regional
wage share decline — suggests that ‘emerging cities’ offer less prospects for
wage progression to its trade partners, but also to some of its own regions.
This poses a challenge to EU cohesion policies. Not only should they address
the well known (and largely explored) EU North-South and West-East divides,
but also the more complex layers of inequalities within each of these blocks,
that our findings identify, and that might require a more complex, indeed ‘place
sensitive’ (Iammarino et al., 2020) strategy.
Indeed, the challenges for implementing the new EU Cohesion policy legisla-
tive package 2021-27 are not only due to the aftermath of the Covid-19 pan-
demic and its risks for social cohesion. Rather, we argue, because of the struc-
tural, ingrained nature of EU regional asymmetries, which innovation seems in
some cases to exacerbate, the challenges to ‘fill [cohesion policy] with content
and prioritise the investments’17 are linked to the risks of (trade-specialisation)
traps. Re-balancing the multiple layers of asymmetries that emerge from our
analysis would require also inter-regional ‘trade-sensitive’ industrial and inno-
vation policies.
In summary, we trust that the exhaustive, fine-grained picture of EU regional
recurring asymmetries identified here helps addressing not only the relatively
well known North-South and East-West imbalances, but also the most hidden
ones, i.e. the persistence of relatively weak regions within strong areas. This
supports the narrative underpinning the need of supporting ‘left behind’ places,
and, we argue, with instruments that are sensitive to the intertwined dynamics
between regional innovation and trade-specialisation.
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A Additional tables and figures
Table 5: Regional NUTS-1 Codes
NUTS-1 Code Country Regional Descriptor NUTS-1 Code Country Regional Descriptor
AT1 Austria Ostosterreich ES1 Spain Noroeste
AT2 Austria Sudosterreich ES2 Spain Noreste
AT3 Austria Westosterreich ES3 Spain Comunidad De Madrid
BE1 Belgium Brussels-Capital Region ES4 Spain Centro (Es)
BE2 Belgium Vlaams Gewest ES5 Spain Este
BE3 Belgium Region Wallonne ES6 Spain Sur
BG3 Bulgaria Severna I Yugoiztochna ES7 Spain Canarias
BG4 Bulgaria Yugozapadna I Yuzhna Tsentralna FI1 Finland Manner-Suomi
CY0 Cyprus Kypros HU1 Hungary Kozep-Magyarorszag
CZ0 Czechia Ceska Republika HU2 Hungary Dunantul
DE1 Germany Baden-Wurttemberg HU3 Hungary Alfold Es Eszak
DE2 Germany Bayern IE0 Ireland Ireland
DE3 Germany Berlin ITC Italy Nord-Ovest
DE4 Germany Brandenburg ITF Italy Sud
DE5 Germany Bremen ITG Italy Isole
DE6 Germany Hamburg ITH Italy Nord-Est
DE7 Germany Hessen ITI Italy Centro (It)
DE8 Germany Mecklenburg-Vorpommern LT0 Lithuania Lietuva
DE9 Germany Niedersachsen LU0 Luxembourg Luxembourg
DEA Germany Nordrhein-Westfalen LV0 Latvia Latvija
DEB Germany Rheinland-Pfalz MT0 Malta Malta
DEC Germany Saarland NL1 Netherlands Noord-Nederland
DED Germany Sachsen NL2 Netherlands Oost-Nederland
DEE Germany Sachsen-Anhalt NL3 Netherlands West-Nederland
DEF Germany Schleswig-Holstein NL4 Netherlands Zuid-Nederland
DEG Germany Thuringen PT1 Portugal Continente
DK0 Denmark Danmark RO1 Romania Macroregiunea Unu
EE0 Estonia Eesti RO2 Romania Macroregiunea Doi
EL3 Greece Attiki RO3 Romania Macroregiunea Trei
EL4 Greece Nisia Aigaiou, Kriti RO4 Romania Macroregiunea Patru
EL5 Greece Voreia Ellada SE1 Sweden Ostra Sverige
EL6 Greece Kentriki Ellada SE2 Sweden Sodra Sverige
SE3 Sweden Norra Sverige
SI0 Slovenia Slovenija
SK0 Slovakia Slovensko
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